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THE WHOLESALE HUMAN: THE INEFFECTUALITY OF RESPONSIVE
REGULATION TO ADVANCEMENTS IN REPRODUCTIVE BIOTECHNOLOGY
POST ROE V. WADE

I. INTRODUCTION
When we wish to see an oak with its massive trunk and spreading
branches and foliage, we are not content to be shown an acorn instead.
So too, Science, the crown of a world of Spirit, is not complete in its beginnings.1

During the last week of November 2018, the University of Hong Kong
hosted the Second International Summit on Human Genome Editing.2 Nobel
laureate David Baltimore chaired the summit, gathering the world’s leading
biotechnological experts to discuss the implications of rapid advancements
in the field.3 Around noon on November 28, a little-known Chinese scientist
by the name of Jiankui He of China’s Southern University of Science and
Technology took the floor.4 Dr. He claimed he had successfully used a recent biotechnological breakthrough to modify the genetic makeup of two
human embryos that were subsequently implanted via in vitro fertilization
(IVF).5 The experiment resulted in a successful pregnancy and live birth of
twin babies.6
By the end of the day, the scientific community at large expressed general condemnation and moral outrage at the news of Dr. He’s presentation.7
Dr. He’s actions were seen as a direct violation of the bioethical boundaries
that the summit sought to address.8 In response to the revelation, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Director, Dr. Francis S. Collins, stated unequivocally that “[i]t is profoundly unfortunate that the first apparent application of this powerful technique to the human germline has been carried out

1. G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 7 (A.V. Miller trans., Oxford
University Press 1977) (1807).
2. Second International Summit on Human Genome Editing Agenda, NAT’L ACADS. OF
SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., http://www.nationalacademies.org/hk/index.html (last visited Aug. 1,
2019).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Pam Belluck, Chinese Scientist Who Says He Edited Babies’ Genes Defends His
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/world/asia/geneediting-babies-he-jiankui.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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so irresponsibly.”9 As the biomedical community clamored against Dr. He’s
experiment, a distinct bioethical and geopolitical moment had undoubtedly
arrived.
The most pressing biotechnological breakthrough that the summit
sought to address is known as CRISPR-Cas9.10 CRISPR-Cas9 is a revolutionary tool that can be used to extract and replace undesirable portions of
an organism’s genetic sequence through a process that is heretofore unsurpassed in accuracy, efficiency, and affordability.11 In its less controversial
applications, CRISPR-Cas9 enables agricultural researchers to genetically
modify crops to make them resistant to pathogens or to extend their normal
lifespans.12 Brought to its theoretical apex by application to the human genome in the context of disease eradication,13 the CRISPR debate primarily
centers on federal funding for clinical trials involving human embryos. 14
Most known diseases are, at least in part, attributable to genetics.15 To
date, the primary method for preventing undesirable genetic traits in human
offspring is to select embryos without those traits to implant via IVF. 16 Because the IVF universe remains largely unregulated in the United States,17
9. Francis S. Collins, Statement on Claim of First Gene-Edited Babies by Chinese
Researcher, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-weare/nih-director/statements/statement-claim-first-gene-edited-babies-chinese-researcher
(“Lest there be any doubt, as we have stated previously, NIH does not support the use of
gene-editing technologies in human embryos.”).
10. See generally Martin Jinek et al., A Programmable Dual-RNA-Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive Bacterial Immunity, 337 SCI. MAG. 816 (2012).
11. See CRISPR Timeline, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/whatbroad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/crispr-timeline (last visited Aug. 1, 2019). This article
provides a rudimentary discussion of the origin of the clustered regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeat (CRISPR)-associated system (Cas) (CRISPR-Cas9).
12. See, e.g., Eric E. Williams, CRISPR: Redefining GMOs—One Edit at a Time, 39 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 437, 445–446 (2017).
13. In the interest of limiting the scope of this note to the framework of current regulatory limitations on embryonic research generally, the prospect of genetic enhancement via
CRISPR-Cas9 will not be considered.
14. See generally COMMITTEE ON HUM. GENE EDITING: SCI., MED., & ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS, HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 7 (2017)
[hereinafter HGE Report] (“In the United States, authorities currently are unable to consider
proposals for this research because of an ongoing prohibition on the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA’s) use of federal funds to review ‘research in which a human embryo
is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification.’”).
15. Frequently Asked Questions About Genetic Disorders, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES.
INST., https://www.genome.gov/19016930/faq-about-genetic-disorders/ (last visited Aug. 1,
2019).
16. See Daniel J. Kevles, The History of Eugenics, in INT’L SUMMIT ON HUMAN GENE
EDITING, A GLOBAL DISCUSSION: COMMISSIONED PAPERS 9 (2015).
17. Tamar Lewin, Industry’s Growth Leads to Leftover Embryos, and Painful Choices,
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/embryos-egg-donorsdifficult-issues.html.
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un-implanted embryos are often donated, frozen, or discarded.18 In response
to the prospect of researchers using these embryos for experimental purposes, Congress passed what is commonly known as the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment.19 The amendment effectively regulated human embryonic research by restricting federal funding for projects that subjected the embryo
to greater risks than were allowable for research on fetuses in utero.20
Limiting federal funding is often preclusive for any commercially inviable research set.21 Moreover, the impact of the current federal regulatory
framework on the prospects of a human application of CRISPR-Cas9 is severe to the point of prohibition.22 Even assuming commercial viability in the
absence of federal funding, the risk is that the technology would be available
only to those who could afford it.23 Given the inherent ethical implications
of embryonic research coupled with the risk of inequitable access, the time
for an overhaul is past due. The issue is how to conceptualize these developments to offer an ethical way forward and, thereby, prevent the unnecessary destruction of human embryos and exclusionary consumerism in embryonic research. This note begins to address that issue by identifying the
extent to which the current regulatory framework restricts CRISPR research.
Then, this note proposes a limited expansion of funding to allow for research only if that research can be defined as interventional medicine.
Part II of this note provides background information on the history of
legislation and regulation in response to advancements in biotechnology
over the half-century since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade. By
analyzing the measures taken by the legislature to confront these advances,
this note will illustrate how current regulation is merely reactionary and
inadaptive to future challenges. Part III summarizes the current federal regulatory scheme that effectively bars federal funding for embryonic applications of CRISPR. Part IV argues for (1) the discontinuation or repeal of the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment as a rider to any subsequent appropriations bills
because it fails to address advancements in biotechnology; (2) substantive
18. Laura Beil, The Fate of Frozen Embryos, PARENTING, https://www.parenting.com/
article/the-fate-of-frozen-embryos (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
19. See The Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat.
34 (1996). The Dickey-Wicker Amendment has been included in every appropriations act
since 1996, and, by its inclusion, it has effectively prohibited the use of federal funding for
any form of embryonic research.
20. Id.
21. Richard D. McCullough, The Lack of Funding is a Tragedy for Bold Scientific
Breakthroughs, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/
09/20/the-cost-of-corporate-funded-research/the-lack-of-funding-is-a-tragedy-for-boldscientific-breakthroughs (“In other words, decreased funding hampers bold science, and
hampering bold science jeopardizes the solutions that we need most.”).
22. HGE Report, supra note 14, at 7.
23. Kevles, supra note 16, at 12.
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legislation to ban all applications of CRISPR-Cas9 to the human genome
through embryonic research; and (3) the development of ethically sound
research strategies to target otherwise untreatable genetic disorders.
II. BACKGROUND
On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its
opinion in Roe v. Wade.24 That same day, nearly 3,000 miles away, a group
of biomedical scientists gathered at the Asilomar Conference Center in
Monterey, California to discuss recent developments in the use of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid.25 The significance of Roe hardly warrants recapitulation here. Its confluence with the landmark advancements in biotechnology examined at Asilomar, however, marked the inception of meaningful
debate in America as it relates to human embryonic research.26 This important moment framed the discussion that ultimately led to the current legislative and regulatory schema governing the prospective uses of CRISPRCas9 for the purposes of embryonic research.27 Part II of this note traces this
development by considering three biotechnological breakthroughs and the
subsequent federal legislative, judicial, and executive reactions thereto that
shaped current law: recombinant DNA, IVF, and embryonic stem cell research.28
A.

Recombinant DNA, Asilomar, and the National Institutes of Health

A fitting place to begin is with the building blocks of life. DNA is the
hereditary material of all multi-cell organisms.29 From its rudimentary beginnings in a laboratory at Columbia University, DNA sequencing for the
purpose of understanding its connection to the heritability of traits and diseases has long been a particularly engaging scientific inquiry.30 Resulting

24. See generally, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. Adam D. Sheingate, Promotion Versus Precaution: The Evolution of Biotechnology
Policy in the United States, 36 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 243, 246 (2006); Donald S. Fredrickson,
Asilomar and Recombinant DNA: The End of the Beginning, in BIO-MEDICAL POLITICS
(1991).
26. Ira H. Carmen et al., Bioconstitutional Politics: Toward an Interdisciplinary Paradigm, 5 POL. AND THE LIFE SCI. 2, 193, 203 (1987).
27. See Russell A. Spivak et al., Germ-line Gene Editing and Congressional Reaction in
Context: Learning from Almost 50 Years of Congressional Reactions to Biomedical Breakthroughs, 30 J.L. & HEALTH 20, 22–23 (2017).
28. Id.
29. An Overview of the Human Genome Project, NIH: NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/12011238/an-overview-of-the-human-genome-project/.
30. See David Stairs, The Visual Representation of the Human Genome, DESIGN ISSUES,
Autumn 2012, at 59–61.
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from an increased understanding of the ways in which DNA could be manipulated, molecular biologists developed a technique in the late 1960s by
which they could create new genetic material by using enzymes to break
DNA strands and recouple the broken fragments into new combinations. 31
The result was termed recombinant DNA, more often known in the scientific community as simply rDNA.32
Even though the prospective benefits of rDNA research were farreaching, regulators and scientists alike feared that microorganisms with
transplanted genes could pose hazards to humans and to other forms of life
on earth.33 In light of these concerns, the biomedical community sought to
define the problem and establish a system of self-regulation to avoid what
appeared to be imminent governmental regulation.34 As has been mentioned,
the forum was the Asilomar Convention Center on January 22, 1973.35
The first Asilomar Conference in 1973 involved a predominantly
American group of biomedical professionals, and the discussions served
mainly to frame the issue that would become the focus of ethical and regulatory debate.36 The conference resulted in a voluntary moratorium on the use
of rDNA technology to allow for more thorough consideration of its potential risks.37 Two years later, in February 1975, a decidedly more international group38 of biologists, lawyers, medical professionals, government officials, and journalists39 convened at Asilomar, producing certain guidelines
and initiating a voluntary ban on any research that could be viewed as potentially hazardous.40 In response to the recommendations of the Asilomar at-

31. David A. Jackson, Robert H. Symons & Paul Berg, Biochemical Method for Inserting New Genetic Information into DNA of Simian Virus 40: Circular SV40 DNA Molecules
Containing Lambda Phage Genes and the Galactose Operon of Escherichia Coli, 69 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 2904, 2904–09 (1972); Janet E. Mertz & Ronald W. Davis,
Cleavage of DNA by R1 restriction endonuclease generates cohesive ends, 69 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 3370, 3370–74 (1972); Stanley N. Cohen, Annie C. Y. Chang, Herbert
W. Boyer & Robert B. Helling, Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids
In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 3240, 3240–44 (1973).
32. Recombinant DNA (rDNA), NIH: NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/genetics-glossary/Recombinant-DNA (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
33. Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,904 (July 7,
1976).
34. Sheingate, supra note 25, at 246.
35. Fredrickson, supra note 25.
36. Id.
37. Editors, Considerations in the Regulation of Biological Research, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
1420, 1422 (1978).
38. Id.
39. Spivak, supra note 27, at 24.
40. Considerations in the Regulation of Biological Research, supra note 37, at 1422
(“These guidelines provide for both physical and biological containment requirements of
increasing severity depending on the perceived level of danger. The physical guidelines en-
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tendees, the Director of the NIH convened an Advisory Committee for the
purposes of codifying the scientific consensus.41 On July 7, 1976, the committee issued its own guidelines,42 which generally deferred to the collective
judgment of the scientific community.43 The guidelines established the conditions upon which the NIH would provide federal funding for rDNA research.44 Nevertheless, in the absence of Congressional action to prohibit
privately funded research, contravention of those guidelines carried no penalty beyond peer condemnation.45
Having garnered significant public attention, rDNA research became a
substantial point of discussion at all levels of government.46 Local governments in the vicinities of the nation’s most prestigious universities exercised
limited regulatory agency over the research, enacting rDNA-focused ordinances by operation of various municipal health boards.47 Additionally, the
state governments of Maryland and New York enacted legislation geared
toward addressing the risks of rDNA research through the enforcement of
strict licensing requirements.48 The federal government, unable to reach a
national consensus beyond continued reliance on the NIH guidelines to curtail the sources of funding, never passed a single piece of legislation.49
As will be shown in the following subparts, the hesitance of public officials to enact meaningful legislation to address the risks of scientific inquiry into rDNA established a precedent of deference to scientific decisionmaking in the realm of American bioethics.50 Carried forward through the
last half-century of bioethical debate, this model exemplifies Congress’s
general unwillingness to apply moral and ethical principles to define the
outer boundaries of science.51 The NIH’s adoption of the Asilomar rDNA
guidelines, therefore, represented a shift in the public’s relationship to sci-

sure that no dangerous organism will escape the laboratory; the biological requirements ensure that no organism which does escape will be able to survive outside the laboratory.”).
41. Spivak, supra note 27, at 24.
42. Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27902–27904 (July 7, 1976).
43. Paul Berg et al., Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 SCI. 303
(1974) (providing recommendations regarding the potential hazards of emerging DNA research capabilities).
44. Id.
45. Bernard Talbot, Development of the National Institutes of Health Guidelines for
Recombinant DNA Research, 98 PUB. HEALTH REP. 361, 365 (1983).
46. Spivak, supra note 27, at 24.
47. Talbot, supra note 45, at 365.
48. Sheldon Krimsky & David Ozonoff, Recombinant DNA Research: The Scope and
Limits of Regulation, 69 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1252, 1252 (1979).
49. Spivak, supra note 27, at 24.
50. O. Carter Snead, Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1529, 1554 (2010).
51. Id.
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ence that has had a significant and lasting effect.52 In the end, the federal
government’s response merely defined the kind of research it would pay for,
leaving the underlying questions of ethics and risk mitigation largely unanswered.
B.

In Vitro Fertilization

On July 25, 1978, Louise Brown was introduced to the world.53 Her
birth was the result of IVF, a biomedical procedure that had captivated scientists for most of the century.54 The two British doctors responsible for the
success of the procedure received both praise and reproach from a public
that had not shown such an invested interest in a scientific advancement
since the introduction of the atomic bomb.55 Essentially, IVF is the ability to
fertilize a human egg outside a woman’s body to produce a viable human
embryo that can withstand assisted uterine implantation, resulting in a
healthy pregnancy.56 For many couples who could not otherwise conceive,
IFV provided boundless hope.57 Despite the generalized fear and anxiety of
those who criticized the procedure, Louise’s health and her incontestably
routine birth alleviated much of the public concern that placed the safety of
IVF in question.58 Because the continued success of the procedure widely
dispelled primary concerns about the health and safety of babies and mothers,59 the focus of the bioethical debate turned to the disposition of excess
embryos that would likely never be implanted.60 Even so, in similar fashion
to the federal government’s response to rDNA research, IVF research would
not have the full benefit of federal funding until nearly fifteen years after the
birth of baby Louise with the enactment of the NIH Revitalization Act of
1993.61 As such, contextualization of the delay in federal funding requires

52. See Sheila Jasanoff et al., CRISPR Democracy: Gene Editing and the Need for Inclusive Deliberation, 32 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 1, 25–32 (2015).
53. J. BENJAMIN HURLBUT, EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRACY: HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH
AND THE POLITICS OF BIOETHICS 39 (2017).
54. Id.
TIMES
(July
28,
1978),
55. Conceiving
the
Inconceivable,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/07/28/archives/conceiving-the-inconceivable.html.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Charis Thompson, IVF Global Histories, USA: Between Rock and a Marketplace, 2
REPROD. BIOMEDICINE & SOC’Y ONLINE 130–131 (2016), https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S2405661816300235 (detailing the first clinical success of IVF in the
United States in 1981 with the birth of Elizabeth Carr).
60. Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 39.
61. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–43, § 121,
107 Stat. 122, 133 (1993).
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attention to two important bioethical events: Roe v. Wade and the National
Research Act of 1974.62
With respect to the legal status of a human embryo, Roe v. Wade forms
the backdrop against which bioethical debate has played itself out over the
course of the last fifty years.63 In Roe, the Supreme Court placed the point of
compelling government interest at viability, meaning the point at which it is
feasible for a fetus to survive outside the womb.64 The lesser pre-viability
interest established the basis for the Court’s preservation of what it found to
be a fundamental right to abortion.65 Because the Court did not need to
comment on the disposition of aborted fetuses, it did not address the practice
of post-abortive fetal research.66 Resultantly, even though fetal research had
received little legislative or regulatory attention prior to Roe,67 its inherent
connection to the abortion debate roused the mechanisms of legislative action to fill the gap.68
In part, as a response to public concern over the post-abortive disposition of fetuses, Congress enacted the National Research Act of 1974.69 The
Act established the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (“National Commission”) as
part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW),70 the precursor to today’s Department of Health and Human Services. As its initial
act, the National Commission placed a provisional four-month moratorium
on federal funding for fetal research pending the results of a statutorily prescribed study on the topic.71 Additionally, HEW invited public comment to
discuss what, if any, future research would receive federal funding. 72 The
National Commission’s findings identified an existing body of regulation73
under which it recommended fetal research continue, thereby adopting a
policy that limited the research to instances in which a fetus would be exposed to no more than minimal risk.74 When the National Commission is62. See Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 39; see generally National Research Act, Pub. L. No.
93–348, 88 Stat. 342, 42 U.S.C. § 289 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76
VA. L. REV. 437, 484 (1991).
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 113.
67. Steven Maynard-Moody, Managing Controversies over Science: The Case of Fetal
Research, 5 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 10 (1995).
68. Id. at 10, 12; Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 49.
69. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to
300aaa-13 (1994)).
70. Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 48.
71. Id. at 49.
72. Id. at 54.
73. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101, et seq. (2018).
74. Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 50.
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sued its final regulatory proposal in 1975, a remnant of HEW’s prior deliberations on the topic of IVF remained in the language. 75 Even though IVF
was beyond the scope of the commission’s charge and bore only nominal
relation to fetal research generally, the proposal maintained a requirement
for future IVF research initiatives to obtain approval from a HEW created
Ethics Advisory Board (EAB).76 When reports of the birth of Louise Brown
captured the national interest three years later, HEW exercised its oversight
by energizing the EAB to control what appeared to be inevitable public demand for the procedure.77
After considering the underlying ethical and moral implications of IVF,
the EAB delivered its report to the HEW Secretary, essentially reinforcing
its regulatory approval authority for funding any form of IVF research.78
Beginning with the replacement of the National Commission with the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in late 1978,79 what followed was a seemingly unintended de facto moratorium on IVF research throughout the 1980s
and into the early 1990s.80
Due to a change in HEW leadership in conjunction with a shift in departmental prioritization of its regulatory affairs in preparation for an impending change in presidential administration, IVF research initiatives decreased in priority toward the end of 1979.81 Furthermore, in the transition of
responsibility for EAB funding from the national commission to the newly
formed presidential commission, ineffectual departmental communication
with Congress resulted in a lack of appropriations to fund the EAB. 82 Without funding, the EAB, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist.83 In retrospect, the ineffectuality of executive and legislative coordination is tragicomic. On the one hand, IVF researchers could only access federal funding
through the approval of the EAB.84 On the other, there was no EAB through
which researchers could apply for and receive approval.85 This remained the
Id. at 54.
Id.
Spivak, supra note 27, at 28.
See generally ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (1979) [hereinafter EAB REPORT]; Spivak, supra note
27, at 28; Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 76.
79. Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 77; see generally National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93348, 88 Stat. 342, 42 U.S.C. § 289 (1974).
80. Spivak, supra note 27, at 28; Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 77–78.
81. Hurlbut, supra note 53, at 76–77.
82. Id. at 77–78.
83. Spivak, supra note 27, at 28.
84. Id.
85. Id.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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state of affairs until the enactment of the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993,
which removed the EAB approval requirement and reopened access to federal funding.86
Confronted with the prospect of providing federal funding for the creation of embryos through IVF and the likelihood of the embryos being used
for research purposes, Congress enacted what, to date, has been the single
most influential and important piece of legislation with respect to embryonic
research: the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.87 The amendment has been reenacted as an appropriations rider every year since 1996. Part III of this note
will discuss the amendment in detail.88 In short, the amendment has, for
more than two decades, effectively prohibited federal funding for the “creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes” and “research in
which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly
subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for research on
fetuses in utero.”89 In light of the funding restrictions imposed by the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, NIH initially interpreted the statute to proscribe
federal funding for any form of human embryonic research, including
equipment to support research.90 Nonetheless, in response to the development of embryonic stem cell research, NIH’s interpretation would be critiqued, argued, and honed by every branch of the federal government.91
C.

Embryonic Stem Cell Research

In November 1998, researchers from both Johns Hopkins University
and the University of Wisconsin-Madison unveiled the results of their unaffiliated studies that collectively demonstrated the power and potential of the
human embryonic stem cell.92 By deriving cells from both an aborted fetus93
and an excess embryo produced in the process of IVF94 respectively, the
research teams were able to culture cell lines that could be used for a variety
86. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (1993); see also Spivak, supra note 27, at 29–30.
87. The Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 34
(1996).
88. See infra Part III.A.
89. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 508, 132 Stat 348
(2018).
90. R. Alta Charo et al., Stem Cell Research: A Legal History of the Federal Funding
Ban on Destructive Human Embryo Research 1995 to the Present, 20110126 AM. HEALTH
LAW. ASS’N SEMINAR PAPERS 75 (2011).
91. See infra Part II.C.
92. Toni Marzotto & Patricia M. Alt, The Ups and Downs of Stem Cell Research: The
Impact of Policy Uncertainty, 35 J. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. ADMIN. 3, 334–35 (2012).
93. The Johns Hopkins team led by Dr. John Gearhart utilized aborted fetuses. Id.
94. The Wisconsin-Madison team led by Dr. James Thomson utilized excess embryos
produced in the process of IVF. Id.
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of promising therapeutic and regenerative medical purposes.95 As described
by Dr. Thomson of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, advanced research using human embryonic stem cells would “provide a potentially limitless source of cells for drug discovery and transplantation therapies.”96
Despite the purported benefits of the research, the enigmatic restrictions of
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment left the biomedical community, once again,
to question its fiscal limits.97
The initial response to the introduction of human embryonic stem cell
(hESC) research at the federal level came in the form of a presidential request for information to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC).98 In 1995, an executive order had created the NBAC to offer policy-driven advice on matters of bioethical import.99 Initial recommendations
from the NBAC included federal funding for embryonic stem cell research
that involved the products of IVF as well as enhanced regulatory oversight
by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the form of a
National Stem Cell Oversight and Review Panel.100 Although no panel was
ever convened, NIH, in response to the recommendations of the NBAC,
assumed the role of bioethics watchdog and began the process of evaluating
the legality of funding in the context of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.101
In August 2000, after having received and reviewed approximately 50,000
comments from Congress, patient advocacy groups, scientific societies, religious organizations, and private citizens,102 NIH published its guidelines.103
The guidelines opened the door to federal funding for research on human
pluripotent stem cells derived from embryos, provided the “human embryos
. . . were created for the purposes of fertility treatment and were in excess of
the clinical need of the individuals seeking such treatment.” 104 Despite what
appeared to be a complete and comprehensive set of rules governing embryonic stem cell research, the political battle had just begun.

95. See Thomas Banchoff, Path Dependence and Value Driven Issues: The Comparative
Politics of Stem Cell Research, 57 WORLD POL. 200, 203 (2005).
96. James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived From Human Blastocysts, 282 SCI. 1145, 1146–47 (1998).
97. Marzotto & Alt, supra note 92, at 340-341.
98. Id. at 340.
99. Exec. Order No. 12975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52062 (Oct. 3, 1995); see also Elisa Eiseman,
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission: Contributing to Public Policy, RAND SCI. &
TECH. POL’Y INST., at iii (2003).
100. Marzotto & Alt, supra note 92, at 340–341.
101. Id. at 340.
102. Id. at 342.
103. Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, NAT’L INST. HEALTH,
65 Fed. Reg. 166 (Aug. 25, 2000).
104. Id. at § II(A)(2).
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The change in presidential administration in 2001 initiated a categorical restructuring of the framework for hESC research on the national level.
While, under the NIH guidelines, there existed no restriction on the creation
of new stem cell lines as long as those lines were produced using the products of IVF, a new executive policy hamstrung the biomedical community’s
momentum in the field by limiting federal funding to stem cell lines already
in existence.105 The NIH assessed that the newly imposed limitation would
confine research to 64 existing stem cell lines.106 Over the next five years,
bipartisan Congressional backlash to the executive restrictions resulted in
two enactments expanding access to funding.107 Both were vetoed outright,108 leaving the administration’s restrictions in place to be formally imposed by executive order in 2007.109
Two years later, as a result of yet another change in presidential administration, an executive order110 rescinded the funding restrictions imposed by
the previous administration. In order to define the limits of the DickeyWicker Amendment, the NIH reincorporated its previous findings into a
new set of guidelines.111 By distinguishing between human embryos as organisms and stem cells as sub-organisms incapable of human life, the guidelines allowed federal funding for hESC research on stem cell lines derived
from embryos created through privately funded IVF procedures.112 Although
the bureaucratic processes necessary to distribute funds lagged at first, researchers eventually began to reap the benefits of the NIH’s relaxed standards.113 Having lost executive support, opponents of stem cell research
turned to the judiciary.114

105. Press Release from President George W. Bush, President Discusses Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/08/
20010809-2.html.
106. New Limits on Funding of Stem Cell Research Questioned, 18 ISSUES IN SCI. &
TECH., 29–30 (2001).
107. See generally, Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. (2005);
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, H.R. 3043, 110th Cong. (2008); Spivak, supra note 27, at 36.
108. Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. (2005); Departments
of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, H.R. 3043, 110th Cong. (2008); Spivak, supra note 27, at 36.
109. Exec. Order No. 13435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34591 (June 20, 2007).
110. Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10667 (Mar. 9, 2009).
111. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed.
Reg. 32,170.
112. Id.
113. Marzotto & Alt, supra note 92, at 345.
114. See Sherley v. Sebelius, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 689 F.3d 776
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied 568 U.S. 1087 (2013).
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In Sherley v. Sebelius, an hESC opposition group challenged the revised NIH guidelines as contrary to the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.115 The
group sought declarations “that the [g]uidelines [were] not in accordance
with law, were promulgated without the observance of required procedures,
[were] arbitrary and capricious, and that past acts by the NIH pursuant to the
Guidelines, including previous decisions to fund embryonic stem cell research projects, [were] null and void.”116 Because the group included researchers engaging in a competitive enterprise of adult stem cell research
that was subject to decreased funding if guidelines were affirmed, the court
found that the group had successfully established Article III standing. 117 In
an opinion largely guided by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,118 the Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the NIH, holding that the guidelines were based on a
reasonable interpretation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment and entitled to
deference.119 The ruling was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit120 and denied certiorari before the United States Supreme Court.121 With the legal challenge put to rest, hESC research found its footing. Nonetheless, in her prescient concurrence to the
appellate opinion, Judge Janice Rogers Brown effectively framed the issue
going forward:
The challenging—and constantly evolving—issues presented by bioethics are critical and complex. Striking the right balance is not easy and
not, in the first instance, a task for judges. What must be defended is “the
integrity of science, the legitimacy of government, and the continuing vitality” of concepts like human dignity. Given the weighty interests at
stake in this encounter between science and ethics, relying on an increasingly Delphic, decade-old single paragraph rider on an appropriations
bill hardly seems adequate.122

115. Id. at 8.
116. Id. at 8–9.
117. Id. at 12.
118. See generally Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This case is
widely understood to have created the doctrine of deference to an administrative interpretation of a statute when the statute is found to be ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation
presents a permissible construction of the statute. Under these circumstances, a court will
decline to substitute its own interpretation for that of the appropriate administrative body. Id.
at 2793.
119. Sherley, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
120. Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied 568 U.S. 1087
(2013).
121. Sherley v. Sebelius, 568 U.S. 1087 (2013).
122. Sherley, 689 F.3d at 790 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring).
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Nearly two years later, her words would strike at the heart of the issues
surrounding biotechnology’s next major development—CRISPR-Cas9. This
warning is perhaps more relevant now than ever in light of the current regulatory framework’s restrictions on federal funding for any form of embryonic research using CRISPR technology.
III. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
As previously indicated, the Dickey-Wicker Amendment remains the
primary regulatory construct through which the federal government actively
restricts federal funding to embryonic research.123 As will be shown in the
following subsection, standing alone, the amendment is not an absolute bar
to funding for applications of CRISPR-Cas9.124 Perhaps in recognition of the
amendment’s inadequacy to confront the rapid advancement of biotechnology in relation to gene editing systems, the NIH has expressly refused to fund
any use of gene editing technologies in human embryos.125 Further, because
protocol proposals for human germline genetic modification are summarily
rejected by the Department of Health and Human Services without review,126 no federal funding is presently available to use CRISPR-Cas9 for
purposes of human germline editing in embryos.
A.

Dickey-Wicker Amendment and CRISPR-Cas9

The extent to which the Dickey-Wicker Amendment precludes federal
funding of human germline editing via CRISPR is limited. Under section
508 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018,127 the amendment
states:
(a) None of the funds made available in this Act may be used for—
(1)
the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or
(2)
research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or
death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. See infra Part III.A.
125. Collins, supra note 9.
126. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT
OR SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES 100 (2016) (“The NIH will not at present entertain
proposals for germ line alterations but will consider proposals involving somatic cell gene
transfer.”).
127. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 508, 132 Stat 348
(2018).
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utero under 45 CFR 46.204(b)128 and section 498(b) of the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 289g(b)).129

Under the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the amendment with respect
to embryonic stem cells, “research” is a “discrete endeavor,” severable from
the extended processes through which the cells are derived.130 Therefore, if
stem cells are derived from embryos destroyed as a result of a private enterprise, current law does not bar federal funding for research using the cells
because the two-staged process constitutes separate, discrete endeavors.131
The stem cell extraction process, considered independently of the subsequent stem cell research, is considered a distinct process, and, as such, separate “research” altogether from the handling of the stem cells after extraction.132 Even so, Sherley appears to reinforce the proposition that the
amendment’s prohibition is absolute against funding any direct manipulation of an embryo for scientific purposes resulting in the destruction or discarding of the embryo.133
Because the court did not address the third disjunctive phrase of §
508(a)(2), the Sherley decision offers little help in discerning the extent to
which the amendment prohibits funding for research in which an embryo is
subjected to no more risk than is allowed for research on fetuses in utero. By
reference to 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(b) as it pertains to fetuses in utero, a plain
reading of the amendment effectively limits embryonic research to “interventions or procedures that hold out the prospect of direct benefit for . . . the
[embryo].”134 Federal regulation defines “intervention” as “physical procedures by which information or biospecimens are gathered (e.g., venipuncture) and manipulations of the subject or the subject’s environment that are

128. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(b) (2018) (“Pregnant women or fetuses may be involved in research if all of the following conditions are met . . . (b) The risk to the fetus is caused solely
by interventions or procedures that hold out the prospect of direct benefit for the woman or
the fetus; or, if there is no such prospect of benefit, the risk to the fetus is not greater than
minimal and the purpose of the research is the development of important biomedical
knowledge which cannot be obtained by any other means . . . .”).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 289g(b) (2018) (“In administering regulations for the protection of human research subjects which— (1) apply to research conducted or supported by the Secretary; (2) involve living human fetuses in utero; (3) are published in section 46.208 of part 46
of title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations; or any successor to such regulations, the Secretary shall require that the risk standard (published in section 46.102(g) of such part 46 or
any successor to such regulations) be the same for fetuses which are intended to be aborted
and fetuses which are intended to be carried to term.”).
130. Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(b) (2018).
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performed for research purposes.”135 Neither federal statutes nor regulations
define “procedure,” and, thus, by the generally accepted cannons of statutory construction, the ordinary meaning of the term may clarify the ambiguity.136 A “procedure” is “a series of steps followed in a regular definite order.”137 Under this interpretation, the NIH has, as recently as 2010, provided
funding for fetal research to treat non-life threatening illnesses.138
The NIH recently funded a study involving an in utero procedure to
treat spina bifida in fetuses.139 As evidenced by the study, the risk of fetal
death does not preclude funding under 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(b).140 During the
seven-year study, partially funded by the NIH’s Eunice Kennedy Shriver
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, 183 women
participated in a randomized trial comparing the results of prenatal and
postnatal repairs of spinal abnormalities in fetuses and infants respectively.141 Although the life expectancy of those born with spina bifida is approximately 40 years,142 the in utero procedure typically results in increased mobility and self-sufficiency whereas, untreated, spina bifida can otherwise
result in paralysis and severe bowel and bladder dysfunctions.143 Of the fetuses that underwent the procedure in utero to correct the abnormality, two
died.144 This equaled the mortality rate of the postnatal research group.145
Upon completion, the study found that prenatal outcomes were generally
more favorable than postnatal outcomes.146 As a result, researchers determined that prenatal intervention was a preferable mode of treatment.147
Thus, if the use of CRISPR-Cas9 to effectively target and treat genetic
disorders can be viewed as an “intervention or procedure,” the Dickey135. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(2) (2018).
136. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988) (interpreting the word
“criteria” under an interim HEW regulation by reference to Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary).
137. Procedure, WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011).
138. See generally N. Scott Adzik et al., A Randomized Trial of Prenatal Versus Postnatal Repair of Myelomeningocele, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 993 (2011) (discussing the results of
fetal research partially funded by the NIH); Surgery on Fetus Reduces Complications of
Spina Bifida, NIH (2011), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/newsroom/releases/020911-MOMS.
139. Adzik, supra note 139, at 993.
140. Id. at 997.
141. Id.
142. C.M. Dillon et al., Longevity of Patients Born with Myelomeningocele, 10 EUR. J.
PED. SURG. 33 (2000) (“Our data extend life expectancy for patients with MM and hydrocephalus to age 40 years with some reliability for those treated from 1957 to 1974, but only
24 years for those treated with modern techniques after 1974.”).
143. Adzik, supra note 139, at 994.
144. Id. at 997.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Wicker Amendment is inadequate to prohibit federal funding because the
technology holds out the prospect of a direct benefit to the embryo. Currently, however, the NIH’s interpretation of the amendment, as expressed by the
NIH Director, explicitly prohibits federal funding for “any use of geneediting technologies in human embryos.”148
B.

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in Relation to CRISPRCas9

Perhaps in recognition of the inadequacy of the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment to effectively prohibit funding for all applications of CRISPRCas9, the 2016 House of Representatives passed a supplementary rider to
the annual appropriations bill to directly address gene editing systems.149
The rider categorizes CRISPR-Cas9 as a biological product subject to the
Public Health Service Act.150 As such, the law prohibits the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
from acknowledging receipt of submissions for investigational use of the
technology “in research in which a human embryo is intentionally created or
modified to include a heritable genetic modification.”151 Under this new law,
CRISPR-Cas9 can be considered an enzymatic protein within the broad
statutory definition for biological products as listed under 42 U.S.C. §
262(i).152 As a result, this restriction not only prohibits funding but also precludes even privatized clinical trials,153 effectively banning human genome
editing one year at a time.154 Under this statutory scheme, the FDA stands as
a stalwart of the legislature’s two-tiered system of regulation, and likely will
148. Collins, supra note 9.
149. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 749, 129 Stat. 2242, 2283
(2016).
150. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2018) (“The term ‘biological product’ means a
virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative,
allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous
product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of
human beings.”) (emphasis added).
151. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 734, 132 Stat 348
(2018).
152. Id.
153. What are Clinical Trials and Studies, NIH: NAT’L INST. ON AGING,
https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-are-clinical-trials-and-studies (last visited March 10,
2019) (“Clinical trials are research studies performed in people that are aimed at evaluating a
medical, surgical, or behavioral intervention. They are the primary way that researchers find
out if a new treatment, like a new drug or diet or medical device (for example, a pacemaker)
is safe and effective in people. Often a clinical trial is used to learn if a new treatment is more
effective and/or has less harmful side effects than the standard treatment.”).
154. HGE Report, supra note 14, at 136.

220

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

remain so unless supplanted by a successful initiative for an overhaul in
biotechnological governance.
IV. ARGUMENT
Part IV of this note argues that the historical approaches to regulating
biotechnology are outdated and inadequate to address the gene editing uses
of CRISPR. The following analysis, therefore, calls for enactment of substantive legislation under the Commerce Clause to ban all applications of
CRISPR to the human embryo. Once in effect, federal oversight and funding
should be used to pursue technological development within the already established scientific norms derived from the First and Second International
Summits on Human Genome Editing.155 Thus, by requiring the NIH to approve and control all projects related to human embryonic testing of
CRISPR, limited funding should be targeted at eradicating heritable genetic
disorders such as Tay Sachs disease, in line with currently funded in utero
fetal research studies as described in Part III.156
A.

The Historical Reactive Models in Relation to rDNA, IVF, and hESC
Should Be Abandoned as Outdated and Inadequate

As was arguably intended by the biomedical community at Asilomar,
proactive self-governance in the realm of biomedicine and biotechnology
has historically warded off restrictive legislation in response to scientific
advancements.157 To be sure, as Dr. Baltimore averred upon the conclusion
of the First International Summit on Human Genome Editing in 2015, “consideration of the path forward is not solely the responsibility of scientific
researchers.”158 Nonetheless, the Asilomar model, while seemingly including broad perspectives, is essentially geared toward consensus-making to
ensure freedom of action in a self-imposed ethical construct.159 As evidenced
by the verbatim assimilation of the recommendations of Asilomar into a
regulatory framework to address the inherent risks of rDNA,160 political ac-

155. See Press Release, Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Eng’g, & Med., On Human Gene Editing:
International Summit Statement (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/
onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12032015a; Press Release, Nat’l Acads. Of Scis.,
Eng’g, & Med., On Human Gene Editing II: International Summit Statement (Nov. 29,
2018), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11282018b.
156. See supra Part III.A.
157. Jasanoff, supra note 52, at 29.
158. David Baltimore, Why We Need a Summit on Human Gene Editing, 32 ISSUES IN SCI.
& TECH. 3, 36 (2016).
159. See Jasanoff, supra note 52, at 26.
160. See Snead, supra note 50, at 1554.
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tion in response to biotechnological breakthroughs in the United States has
largely been subservient to the will of science.161
While the outcomes most feared did not materialize with respect to
rDNA applications,162 there can be little doubt that, in light of the unknown
economic, social, and political implications of biotechnology at the time, 163
the reliance on a strictly scientific perspective lacked both depth of analysis
and social conscience. The outcome-based approach to biotechnological
governance often leaves many unanswered questions in the wake of a singular good result.164 With respect to CRISPR, though the issue admittedly has
been addressed by the scientific community, the wealth-based access to unregulated genetic modification is a primary concern that the biomedical field
is particularly inept to address.165 Especially telling in this regard is the National Academies’ acceptance of the risk simply because inequity in
healthcare is not a problem unique to gene editing.166 Although the scientific
community at large has striven to provide reasonable and measured approaches to developing CRISPR technology,167 ethical gaps and a general
reluctance to accept societal harm as a meaningful boundary exemplify the
need for regulation outside the biomedical community.168
Further, the likelihood of leaving private industry to its own devices in
regulating gene editing has already been precluded by Congress’s reliance
on the FDA to stem clinical trials.169 As has been discussed previously,170 the
IVF model, representative of a conglomeration of bureaucratic and legislative miscommunication resulting in regulatory uncertainty, recommends
nothing to the current CRISPR debate.171 A moratorium on public funding
without substantial restrictions on private enterprise is unlikely to suit the
public appetite for development of human applications of CRISPR, and “the

161. J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Limits of Responsibility: Genome Editing, Asilomar, and the
Politics of Deliberation, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 12 (2015) (“Forty years later, the legacy
of Asilomar lives on in the notion that society is not in a position to judge the ethical significance of scientific projects until scientists can declare with certainty what is realistic: in effect, until the imagined scenarios are already upon us.”).
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. Jasanoff, supra note 52, at 31.
164. See supra Part III.B.
165. See, e.g., HGE Report, supra note 14, at 128.
166. Id.
167. See generally, Adam P. Cribbs & Sumeth M.W. Perara, Science and Bioethics of
CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Editing: An Analysis Towards Separating Facts and Fiction, 90 YALE J.
BIO. AND MED. 625 (2017).
168. See Hurlbut, supra note 162, at 13.
169. See supra Part III.B.
170. See supra Part II.B.
171. See supra Part II.B.
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already-existing level of congressional interest and the fears associated with
gene editing”172 make long-term inaction a relative impossibility.
Finally, as ethical boundaries have potentially already been crossed
with regard to Dr. He’s widely condemned experiment, substantive legislation is the most appropriate response to clearly identify the limitations of
future CRISPR applications to the human genome within a workable and
ethical construct.
B.

Legislation Under the Commerce Clause Coupled with an NIH-Funded
Regulatory Program for Limited CRISPR Research is Necessary to Define and Implement Ethical Approaches to Scientific Inquiry

General applications of biotechnology, and CRISPR in particular, substantially affect interstate commerce, and, as such, Congress has the power
to enact laws to impose reasonable restrictions on the use of biotechnology.173 The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce.”174 This power has been interpreted to include regulation of the
“channels of interstate commerce,” “persons or things in interstate commerce,” and “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”175 In its use of this power, Congress maintains the authority to anticipate the effects that an economic activity will have on commerce.176
As a subset of the biotechnological industry, the top ten most productive companies dedicated to the application of CRISPR technology in both
public and private settings have reported annual revenue in excess of $700
million.177 Although American companies, due to the FDA’s clinical trial
restrictions, are not currently in the business of applying CRISPR to the
human genome through embryonic research, the potential effect of allowing
this research would almost certainly entail a redistribution of assets and materials through interstate commerce.178 Taken in the aggregate, this activity
172. Spivak, supra note 27, at 38.
173. Natalie Ram, Science as Speech, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1218–19 (2017). While
arguing against a ban on CRISPR under the First Amendment, the author generally acknowledges that constitutional power exists at both the state and federal level to regulate and prohibit the use of CRISPR technology.
174. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
175. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000).
176. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 557 (2012) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (labor practices of utility companies); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (discrimination by hotel operators);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (discrimination by restaurant owners)).
177. Alex Philippidis, Top 10 Companies Leveraging Gene Editing, GENETIC
ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (2018), https://www.genengnews.com/lists/top-10companies-leveraging-gene-editing.
178. See Ram, supra note 174, at 1218.
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is sufficiently connected to interstate commerce to justify congressional
regulation.179
Nevertheless, a likely challenge to congressionally mandated restrictions on germline editing may be presented in terms of substantive-dueprocess.180 As with equal protection analysis, substantive-due-process analysis requires strict scrutiny of any legislative action that “impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right.”181 Fundamental rights are
“explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”182 For a right to be
considered “fundamental” it must be susceptible to a “careful description of
the asserted fundamental liberty interest,” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the right was] sacrificed.”183
Recognizing that procreation is “fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the [human] race” and a “basic civil right[ ] of man,”184 the right
of access to genetic modification of embryos, if it exists at all, belongs to the
sources of genetic material from which an embryo is conceived (i.e. a biological man and a biological woman).185 It is argued, therefore, that this right
is inextricably tied to the concept of a right to privacy underlying procreative and parental choice.186 This premise informs both prongs of the Glucksburg substantive-due-process analysis.

179. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)(“We need not determine whether
respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in
fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”); see also, Ram, supra note
174, at 1218–1219 (“Moreover, federal power tied to the Commerce Clause almost certainly
provides the jurisdictional hook required for federal legislation. Modern science, particularly
science involving human biological materials, is very often a venture that involves moving
research materials, funds, or people across state lines. Where that is so, the Commerce Clause
permits the federal government to exercise lawmaking authority.”).
180. See e.g., Tandice Ossareh, Would You Like Blue Eyes with That? A Fundamental
Right to Genetic Modification of Embryos, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 729 (2017).
181. Morrisey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1268 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312) (internal quotations omitted).
182. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
183. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
184. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
185. See, Jason C. Glahn, I Teach You the Superman: Why Congress Cannot Constitutionally Prohibit Genetic Modification, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 431 (2003) (“The [Supreme] Court, through such decisions as Meyer and Pierce, should be construed as having
articulated a general right of parents to inculcate positive traits in their children, traits which
the state ‘can neither supply nor hinder.’”).
186. Amber Stine, The Implications of the Due Process Clause on the Future of Human
Embryonic Gene Therapy, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 507, 515–17 (2003); see also, Ossareh, supra
note 181, at 755–56.
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As to the first prong, the right at issue can be described as that of a parent to choose the circumstances under which that parent is willing to engage
in reproduction without governmental interference.187 The constitutionally
recognized rights of privacy and parental autonomy provide the conceptual
underpinnings of a right to genetic modification of embryos. 188 Here lies
significant precedential tension, highlighted by both Justice Scalia189 and
Justice Stevens190 in their concurring and dissenting opinions to the Supreme
Court’s decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill. Justice Stevens aptly
framed the issue:
I acknowledge that some have read the Court’s opinion in Glucksburg as
an attempt to move substantive due process analysis, for all purposes,
toward an exclusively historical methodology–and thereby to debilitate
the doctrine. If that were ever Glucksburg’s aspiration, Lawrence plainly
renounced it. As between Glucksburg and Lawrence, I have little doubt
which will prove the more enduring precedent.191

Despite this tension, Glucksburg remains good law, and a court must
seek “a careful, specific description of the right at issue in order to determine whether that right, thus narrowly defined, [is] fundamental.”192
In evaluating a description that ties a right to genetically modify embryos to procreative choice and parental autonomy, a primary concern is the
uncertainty surrounding the legal status of an embryo. Some courts that have
considered the issue have done so in the context of marital disputes regarding custody or possession of frozen embryos.193 These courts have struck a
delicate balance, acknowledging that “pre-embryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect . . ..”194 At least one court has explicitly stated
that pre-embryos are not children.195 Mindful of the fact that “[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
187. Ossareh, supra note 181, at 755–58.
188. See id. at 756; see also, Stine, supra note 187, at 517.
189. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 797 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2010) (“The
threshold step of defining the asserted right with precision is entirely unnecessary, however,
if (as Justice Stevens maintains) the ‘conceptual core’ of the ‘liberty clause,’ includes a number of capacious, hazily defined categories.”) (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 858–912 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 873 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 797 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
193. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 591 (Colo. 2018) (citing Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)); see, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597–98 (Tenn.
1992); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 149–50 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
194. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
195. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 148–49 (“Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing
to classify the frozen pre-embryos as children . . .).
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be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,”196 it
is unclear how genetic modification of embryos, at least in the experimental
phase, implicates this decision. It seems a logical aberration to conclude that
a person can be a parent of a non-child. Of course, the alternative entitles the
embryo constitutional protections that would solve the equation altogether.197 Thus, in line with Glucksburg, perhaps, the right at issue is more carefully and more specifically described as that of a person to engage in genetic
experimentation on and modification of embryos constituting “property of a
special character”198 without governmental interference.
Turning to the second Glucksburg prong, it is necessary to assess
whether this right, as described, is one of “those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”199 Unless a court were to
adopt a description of the right at issue that ties it inextricably to privacy,
procreative choice, and parental autonomy, it is doubtful that history would
prove helpful in terms of a substantive-due-process analysis.200 Unknown
complexities, moral and ethical issues, and ongoing political dialog surrounding assisted reproductive technologies counsel against a finding of
historical rootedness.201 Remembering that the Supreme Court “[has] always
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking [sic] in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended,”202 a court is constitutionally bound to allow the
democratic process to govern such new and unexplored territory.203
Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that a court would find Glucksburg
satisfied by some variation of this analysis, it would then apply strict scruti196. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
197. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973) (“If this suggestion of personhood is
established, the appellant’s case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”).
198. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 591 (Colo. 2018) (“Thus, we agree with
courts that have categorized pre-embryos as marital property of a special character.”).
199. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
200. See Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1269–70 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding
“[h]istory and tradition provide no firm footing” to establish the rootedness of IVF, egg donation, and gestational surrogacy because they are decidedly “modern phenomena”).
201. Id.
202. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503
U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
203. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 805 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2010) (“And
the Court’s approach intrudes less upon the democratic process because the rights it acknowledges are those established by a constitutional history formed by democratic decisions; and
the rights it fails to acknowledge are left to be democratically adopted or rejected by the
people, with the assurance that their decision is not subject to judicial revision.”).
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ny to determine if any law regulating genetic modification of embryos is
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”204 The Supreme
Court has consistently held that the state has an important and legitimate
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.205 To date, however, that
interest has primarily been assessed in the context of abortion jurisprudence,
necessitating a balancing of interests between “preserving and protecting the
health of a pregnant woman” and “protecting the potentiality of human
life.”206 Outside that context, a court would be obligated to assess the state’s
interest in protecting nascent human life independent of the complicating
factors that pertain to the health and safety of a mother.207 Under these circumstances, it would be necessary to address the embryo-specific risk factors such as off-target effects as well as the difficulties of eliciting informed
consent on behalf of the offspring because “‘the unforeseeable effects’ may
be greater than the actual level of genetic interference.”208 Although the outcome of such an analysis remains uncertain, it is probable that these distinguishing factors would be sufficient to elevate the state’s already important
interest to the level of compelling interest necessary to withstand strict scrutiny in the event that a court would see fit to apply it.209
Once a congressional ban is in place, the NIH should only allow research that meets the current acceptability criteria for applications of
CRISPR to the human genome through embryonic research. Such restrictions would significantly limit discretion within the biomedical community and focus research within a specified ethical and moral construct to
decrease both individual and societal risk.210 A position paper issued by the
American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) lays out the scientific community’s current attitude toward gene editing.211 Professional organizations

204. See Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)).
205. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 875–76 (1992) (joint opinion) (discussing relevant interests); see, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (discussing the level of interest that the state has in
potential life); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 508, 132 Stat
348 (2018) (affording protections to embryos identical to those afforded to fetuses in utero).
206. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63; see also Ram, supra note 174, at 1219–20.
207. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63.
208. Cribbs, supra note 168, at 629–30.
209. Ram, supra note 174, at 1220.
210. See Snead, supra note 50, at 1534 (“Procedurally, delegating bioethical questions to
scientists creates serious problems for democratic accountability, and thus legitimacy. More
importantly, this model fails in principle because key premises and methods of scientific
reasoning are incommensurable with the humanistic principles that comprise the currency of
public bioethical deliberation.”).
211. Kelly Ormond et al., Human Germline Genome Editing, 101 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
167, 167 (2017).
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from six continents have reviewed and endorsed this statement.212 The
statement effectively offers solutions for the ethical issues raised by
CRISPR/Cas9 germline gene editing.213 Essentially, “[f]uture clinical application of human germline genome editing should not proceed unless, at a
minimum, there is (a) a compelling medical rationale, (b) an evidence base
that supports its clinical use, (c) an ethical justification, and (d) a transparent
public process to solicit and incorporate stakeholder input.”214
Under these parameters, a potential target for NIH-funded and supervised research would be embryos produced as a result of IVF that have been
confirmed to carry genetic markers for a disease known as Tay Sachs. Tay
Sachs is an inheritable neurodegenerative disease for which there is currently no cure or effective treatment options.215 The most common form of Tay
Sachs disease onsets during the first months of life and results in the loss of
both muscle and mental functions.216 Generally, children afflicted with Tay
Sachs disease do not survive beyond the age of five years.217 To date, the
most reliable method of conception for parents who have recessive genes
that carry the risk of producing offspring with Tay Sachs is through IVF
with preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).218 As a result, seventy-five
percent of these Tay Sachs prone embryos produced through IVF will have
the genetic predisposition for Tay Sachs disease.219
In terms of a compelling medical rationale for the application of
CRISPR to Tay Sachs embryos produced as a result of IVF with PGD, the
lack of viable curative options presents a unique situation among any of the
heritable disorders.220 Because Tay Sachs cannot be treated, and infants born
with the disease have, on average, a life expectancy of no more than five
years,221 the application of CRISPR with the goal of refining the technology
for purposes of eventual implantation arguably qualifies as an intervention

212. Id.
213. Id. at 169–174.
214. Id. at 167.
215. Tay Sachs Disease, NIH, https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/diseases/7737/tay-sachsdisease (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. HGE Report, supra note 14, at 113; Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: PGD, AM.
PREGNANCY
ASS’N,
https://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/preimplantation-geneticdiagnosis/ (last visited July 21, 2019) (“Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is a procedure used prior to implantation to help identify genetic defects within embryos. This serves to
prevent certain genetic diseases or disorders from being passed to the child. The embryos
used in PGD are usually created during the process of in vitro fertilization (IVF).”).
219. Id. at 114 (“In these situations, only one in four embryos would be free of a diseasecausing mutation.”).
220. Tay Sachs Disease, supra note 216.
221. Id.
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or procedure similar to those previously funded for research in fetuses in
utero.222
Of course, the risks of embryonic destruction far exceed that of fetal
mortality with respect to spina bifida treatment in utero.223 Nevertheless, the
difference in life expectancy changes the risk-benefit calculus in such a way
as to provide an ethical justification in line with the ASHG’s criteria.224 Although it may be difficult to estimate with any certainty the number of negative embryonic outcomes that will result from CRISPR interventions, it is
unlikely that, without intervention, any of the PGD identified embryos will
ever be knowingly implanted to produce a healthy pregnancy. Thus, even
one positive outcome in the effort to refine and perfect the CRISPR procedure in Tay Sachs embryos would arguably justify the endeavor.
As the sole conduit through which applications for the use of CRISPR
would be approved, the NIH is well positioned to facilitate a transparent
public process at every stage of development. To the end of soliciting stakeholder input across the board, the NIH should pursue public comment and
continue to seek counsel from future International Summits and the global
scientific community. By targeting Tay Sachs disease with the goal of producing a healthy pregnancy, the NIH will be able to develop the CRISPR
technology in an ethically acceptable manner, and, once perfected, selectively target successive therapeutic applications without the risk of consumerism
and inequitable wealth-based access.
V. CONCLUSION
This note has traced the development of biotechnology over the last
half-century with the aim of showing the inadequacies of reactive federal
regulation. In recognition of those inadequacies, this note further argued that
the current regulatory scheme should be replaced by substantive legislation
under the Commerce Clause to avoid the risks of abuse and misappropriation of CRISPR technology. Even though genetic modification using
CRISPR technology presents numerous opportunities for the eradication of
disease and increasing the quality of human life, substantive legislation will
ensure that the ethical boundaries of science are clearly defined in pursuit of
222. See supra Part III.A (discussing in utero spina bifida interventional treatments approved under the auspices of the NIH).
223. Antonio Regalado, US Scientist Who Edited Human Embryos with CRISPR Responds to Critics, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
611837/us-scientist-who-edited-human-embryos-with-crispr-responds-to-critics/. A scientist
at Oregon Health Sciences University in Portland, Oregon claimed to have repaired a genetic
mutation in dozens of human embryos that were later destroyed upon the conclusion of the
research.
224. See supra Part III.A (discussing life expectancy of those born with spina bifida.)
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those goals. In spite of a long history of inaction and uncertainty in response
to the hardest questions involving the human relationship to nature and mastery of biology, this is not a time for governmental hesitancy. As Hegel understood, science is incomplete in its beginnings, but the suitability of an
end will always depend largely on where it starts.
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